I often have remarked that the U.S. health system reform literature is characterized by a thousand solutions and few clear statements of the problem. In contrast, Katherine Swartz has provided a very readable and logical account of a specific problem with the U.S. health care system and a proposed remedy. The clarity and completeness of her exposition make her book an example of policy analysis done well and made it easy for me to identify points of agreement and disagreement.
The problem that motivates Swartz's analysis is the erosion of health insurance coverage in the middle class. While not minimizing the plight of low-income Americans, she argues that erosion of coverage in the middle class could lead to a social crisis. Problems within the middle class are not evenly distributed, but instead are concentrated among individuals who have health problems and do not have access to group insurance (e.g., self-employed individuals and retirees who are not yet eligible for Medicare). For these individuals and their families, the problem is that health insurance sometimes is unobtainable and when available, often considered unaffordable.
The root cause of the problem, according to Swartz, is medical underwriting -that is, insurers' efforts to identify high-risk individuals for the purpose of denying coverage or charging higher premiums. Swartz considers medical underwriting a very imprecise science that wastes resources and drives up premiums.
The root cause of medical underwriting, in turn, is the fact that the health insurance system in the United States is voluntary. Presumably, mandatory health insurance, either public or private, would achieve universal coverage up to the limits of compliance, though the resulting distribution of resources might be both unfair and inefficient. Swartz does not recommend mandatory coverage, however. Her proposal is based on the assumption of continued voluntary coverage. Her book was written while Massachusetts was grappling with the issue of mandatory coverage, and Massachusetts's decision and its consequences would make an interesting epilogue to her analysis.
Swartz reviews a number of existing approaches to covering the uninsured and finds them all deficient in some regard. A separate pool for high-risk individuals is deficient because insurers still would ''waste'' resources identifying which individuals to send to the high-risk pool. She also notes that some states limit enrollment in high-risk pools because they have trouble providing the premium subsidies required to keep the pool's premiums affordable.
Assessments on insurers to fund high-cost cases are judged deficient because they generally don't cover the entire cost above the threshold value. Additionally, Swartz would like to see the burden of high-cost cases spread over the larger population of taxpayers, rather than just the insurers who are subject to the assessment.
Swartz's proposed solution to medical underwriting is government-based reinsurance. Under her plan, the government would pay for high-cost cases that exceeded some threshold. The insurer's economic returns to identification of high-risk consumers would be reduced, along with denials and limitations of coverage. In addition, the burden of high-cost cases would be spread over the entire tax-paying population.
Swartz's analysis and recommendations are intriguing, but they are based on a number of presuppositions, including: 1) the individual health insurance market is not a helpful option for a significant portion of the uninsured; 2) risk segmentation accompanied by experience-rated premiums is undesirable; and 3) the private reinsurance market is inferior relative to a government reinsurance program.
Regarding the first presupposition, Pauly and Nichols (2002) , considering both the health status of applicants and affordability (measured by the uptake of insurance by people in similar circumstances), found that the individual health insurance market ''works acceptably well for about 80 percent of potential buyers, but its performance for the remaining 20 percent of lowincome or high-risk persons is controversial.'' Swartz's reaction to Pauly's and Nichols' analysis would have been a helpful addition to the book.
Risk segmentation is an old topic in health economics. During the 1970s, a key policy concern was the inability of health insurers to segment consumers into low-and high-risk groups, so that each group would face accurate prices for coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) . Risk segmentation was labeled a ''problem'' in the 1980s when employers offering multiple health plans began to experience uneven risk selection among their plans. Reviewing the literature on risk segmentation, Feldman and Dowd (2000) concluded that the real efficiency culprit in multiple plan offerings is the requirement that each plan charge the same premium to all its enrollees. Whether it is fair for high risks to pay higher premiums depends on the relative means of those providing and receiving the subsidies necessary to equalize premiums. Income transfers from the healthy to the sick, on average, will flow from younger, lower-income individuals to older, higher-income individuals.
Is the current private reinsurance market less desirable than a government-run system? Possibly, but I think we need more evidence. If the efficiency advantage of the government system is a matter of scale, then why hasn't one private reinsurer taken over the entire market? If reinsurance that eliminated the need for medical underwriting or covered 100% of the costs above some threshold were optimal, why aren't those policies the norm in the private reinsurance market? Perhaps Swartz is saying that all people, even those with group insurance, would be willing to subsidize the reinsurance costs for high-risk consumers in the individual insurance market if they were given that opportunity, on the chance that someday they would find themselves in the individual market with significant health problemsand the government is the only entity capable of providing that type of long-term policy.
Hopefully, one point on which we all can agree is that the insurance market is not working well for consumers who cannot purchase insurance at any price. Pauly and Nichols (2002) suggest that truly uninsurable consumers represent less than 1% of the population. Even if it were 1% of the entire nonelderly U.S. population, those consumers would represent only 5% to 6% of the uninsured, but they still matter. Perhaps we also could agree that truly uninsurable consumers, regardless of their income, are a legitimate target for government subsidies. Portable premium vouchers would seem to be a sensible alternative, although reliable verification that a consumer truly is uninsurable can be difficult. Those high-risk consumers still might face higher premiums than low risks, but at least insurance would be available.
I think it is important to parse each of Swartz's arguments in great detail because I agree with her assertion that growing uninsurance in the middle class is a serious social problem. Even among individuals who are offered group insurance through their employer, most of those not participating say that the main problem is cost (Fronstin 2005) . Nonetheless, I do not believe that the long-term solution to the problems with the U.S. health care system is to find new ways to pay for the current level of health services consumption. At the heart of higher costs lies indiscriminant, open-ended government subsidies for both public and private health insurance that result in the indiscriminant, open-ended use of health care services by those with insurance. The time has come for discrimination.
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